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THE ERROR IN APPLYING THE LANGUAGE
CONDUIT-AGENCY THEORY TO
INTERPRETERS UNDER THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
BY GREGORY J. KLUBOK†
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, a trial was held in United States v. Yurofsky,1 a
federal fraud and money laundering case against two
defendants.2 In that case, the government decided to use taped
conversations between the defendants against them at trial.3
Most of the recorded conversations occurred in Russian, so the
government obtained an interpreter to put the conversations into
English.4 The interpreter also created a written transcript of the
Russian-to-English translation, which defense counsel received.5
But unbeknownst to the court or the prosecutor, defense counsel
When the government put the
was fluent in Russian.6
interpreter on the stand, defense counsel cross-examined the
interpreter about the accuracy of the translation.7 The judge
then learned that defense counsel had marked up the translation
with approximately one hundred corrections, and the judge
ordered counsel to share those corrections with the government.8

†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude,
2016, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2013, Stony
Brook University.
1
148 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 55 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2002).
2
Yurofsky, 55 F. App’x at 14.
3
Yurofsky, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
4
Id.
5
See id. at 232.
6
See id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
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Upon further examination, the government agreed with defense
counsel that approximately eighty of the one hundred identified
errors were incorrectly translated.9
What is remarkable about that case is not necessarily that
the interpreter made mistakes in translating the defendants’
statements, but that those mistakes were caught.
The
interpreter’s mistakes were only revealed because the
government opted to put the interpreter on the stand, probably
because the interpreter was the only one who could testify about
the interpretation. Interpreters are used in the criminal justice
system, including during police interrogations, when the suspect
or defendant does not speak English.10 But in most federal
courts, interpreters of a defendant’s statements from a police
interrogation are not subject to the Confrontation Clause, and
the government is not required to call the interpreter to the
stand to admit the interpreted statements into evidence if
someone else can testify about the interpretation.11 These courts
rely on what is known as the language conduit-agency theory,12 in
which the interpreter’s statements are imputed to the defendant
because the interpreter is considered to be an agent of the
defendant or a language conduit.13 Some courts, though, have
correctly rejected the application of the language conduit-agency
theory to interpreters under the Confrontation Clause and have
held that interpreters who translate at police interrogations are
subject to the Confrontation Clause.14
This exclusion of interpreters from the Confrontation Clause
is contrary to the Confrontation Clause, which states that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
9

Id.
See Maxwell Alan Miller et al., Finding Justice in Translation: American
Jurisprudence Affecting Due Process for People with Limited English Proficiency
Together with Practical Suggestions, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 117, 142–47 (2011);
Beth G. Lindie, Note, Inadequate Interpreting Services in Courts and the Rules of
Admissibility of Testimony on Extrajudicial Interpretations, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 399,
420–31 (1993).
11
See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x
607 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991).
12
Although most courts use the term “language conduit theory,” this Note uses
the phrase “language conduit-agency theory” because courts using the theory
simultaneously rely on both agency and language conduit principles.
13
See Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 525–28.
14
See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1323–25 (11th Cir. 2013).
10
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confronted with the witnesses against him.”15 This means that
defendants in criminal proceedings have the right to crossexamine the witnesses against them.16 Moreover, even if a
defendant could subpoena the witnesses against him, the burden
is on the government, not the defendant, to produce those
witnesses at trial.17
There are several reasons why interpreters of a defendant’s
statements from a police interrogation should be subject to the
Confrontation Clause. The language conduit-agency theory
conflicts with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
Confrontation Clause. Moreover, the language conduit-agency
theory is rooted in hearsay, not the Sixth Amendment. The
language conduit-agency theory’s imputation of translated
statements to the defendant improperly conflates the
Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rules. The language
conduit-agency theory’s use of an agency relationship has no
basis in agency law. Finally, the language conduit-agency theory
improperly relies on the reliability of the interpreter. Thus, the
language conduit-agency theory should be rejected as applied to
the Confrontation Clause.
Therefore, interpreters of a
defendant’s statements at a police interrogation, like all other
sources of testimonial statements, should be subject to the
Confrontation Clause.
Part I of this Note explains the origins of the Confrontation
Clause and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic.
Part II of this Note explains the current split of authority among
the United States Courts of Appeals on whether interpreters who
translate at police interrogations are subject to the Confrontation
Clause. Part III of this Note explains why the language conduitagency theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation
Clause and why the government should have to call the
interpreter who translated a defendant’s statements at a police
interrogation to the stand if it wants to introduce the
interpreter’s statements into evidence. Finally, Part IV explains
how prosecutors can use interpreters at interrogations without
running afoul of the Confrontation Clause.

15
16
17

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Origins and Colonial History

The roots of the Confrontation Clause can be traced to the
English common law and British politics before the American
Revolution.18 Since at least the seventeenth century, English
commentators
commended
their
country’s
open
and
confrontational nature of judicial proceedings, even extending to
the cross-examination of adverse witnesses.19 This was in stark
contrast to mainland Europe’s use of the civil-law system, which
allowed—indeed, relied upon—the private examination of
witnesses and the reading of such ex parte testimony into the
record.20
Confrontation in England gained momentum after the trial
of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason in 1603.21
Raleigh had been implicated in treason by Lord Cobham.22
Officials in England had obtained Cobham’s statements outside
the presence of Raleigh, and those statements were read into the
record at trial.23 At trial, Raleigh insisted that Cobham be
brought before him, stating that he could make Cobham recant
his implicatory statements.24 The court refused to do so, and
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.25 Due in part to
18

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–47 (2004).
Id. at 45–47. The adversarial nature of English courts, as opposed to civil-law
courts, was also praised by noted jurist William Blackstone in his Commentaries on
the Laws of England, in which he noted that the “open examination of witnesses
viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up
of truth, than the private and secret examination” of civil-law courts. 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373–74 (Wayne Morrison
ed., Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2001) (1768) (footnote omitted).
20
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
21
Id. at 44−45.
22
Id. at 44.
23
Id.; Michael L. Siegel & Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-conspirator
Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2007).
24
Siegel & Weisman, supra note 23.
25
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: The
Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74
MISS. L.J. 869, 889−90 (2005). Although he was given the death sentence, Raleigh
was not immediately executed. Id. at 895. He spent some time in prison and was
then given command of an English fleet in 1617 that was charged with finding gold
in Guiana. Id. The expedition did not find gold, but instead attacked a Spanish
settlement. Id. Upon return to England, the King put Raleigh on trial before a
private commission to placate the Spanish. Id. The commission decided to execute
Raleigh based on the original death sentence from the 1603 trial. Id.
19
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the uproar over the conduct of Raleigh’s trial, England soon
thereafter passed a series of laws that preserved the right of
confrontation at trial.26
The Confrontation Clause was added to the United States
Constitution because the use of such ex parte examinations
continued at times in the colonies. After fighting the Seven
Years’ War, England was faced with a large amount of war
debts.27 To help pay for this debt, England levied new taxes on
the colonists.28 One of those taxes was contained in the Sugar
Act, which taxed sugar imports to the colonies.29 In 1765,
Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which required all
newspapers, pamphlets, and legal documents to be on official
stamped paper.30 Violations of the Stamp Act and the Sugar Act
were tried in admiralty courts, which were civil-law courts that
were devoid of many of the protections that defendants enjoyed
under the common law.31 In admiralty court, the burden of proof
was on the defendant, not the government.32 There was also no
right to confrontation in admiralty courts; in fact, admiralty
courts “routinely took testimony by deposition or private judicial
examination.”33 Trial in the admiralty courts was met with
protest in the colonies, partly because there was no right of
confrontation in the admiralty courts.34 In light of the lack of
confrontation in pre-Revolutionary times, the Confrontation
Clause was added to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
26

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE PATRIOTS: THE BOSTON TEA PARTY &
THE MAKING OF AMERICA 15 (2010). The British national debt almost doubled
during the Seven Years’ War, and the British victory meant that more money had to
be used to occupy the newly-won territory in North America. 1 JOHN MURRIN ET AL.,
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, POWER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 183 (7th ed.
2016).
28
ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONCISE HISTORY 5–11
(Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 2011).
29
MURRIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 185–86.
30
Id. at 187.
31
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–48; 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 6345 (West 1977).
32
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31.
33
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–48.
34
Id. at 48. Congress, in response to the Stamp Act, protested that “trial by jury
is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.” The
Declaration of the Stamp Act Congress (1765), reprinted in COLONIES TO NATION,
1763–1789: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 64 (Jack P.
Greene ed., 1975).
27
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Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence

In recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed the
Confrontation Clause in such a way that makes the language
conduit-agency theory inherently incompatible with the
Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause was
incorporated into constitutional jurisprudence in 1965 with
Pointer v. Texas.35 Prior to 2004, the leading case on the
Confrontation Clause was Ohio v. Roberts.36 Under Roberts and
its progeny, statements from an unavailable witness that were
deemed to have “adequate indicia of reliability” or that fell under
a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” satisfied the Confrontation
Clause even though the defendant never confronted the
declarant.37 But in Bourjaily v. United States,38 the Court eroded
the requirement that the witness be unavailable, instead
focusing on the reliability of the statements.39 Until 2004, it was
this Roberts test that was used by courts in analyzing the
Confrontation Clause.
But the Roberts test was rejected by Crawford v.
Washington40 and its progeny, which have revolutionized the
Confrontation Clause in recent years.
In Crawford, the
defendant was convicted of assault after he stabbed a man.41
During their investigation of this assault, police officers
interrogated the defendant’s wife, who gave an account of the
stabbing.42 At trial, the defendant’s wife did not testify due to the
marital privilege, but in Washington, the marital privilege does
not extend to a spouse’s statements that would be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rules.43 In that case, the
defendant’s wife helped to organize the assault, so her
statements were admitted as statements against interest.44 The

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 66 (internal quotation omitted); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Id. at 182–84.
541 U.S. 36.
Id. at 38, 41.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
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defendant then claimed that his Confrontation Clause rights
were violated because the government did not call his wife to the
stand.45
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant. Reinforcing
that the Confrontation Clause applies to both in-court and out-ofcourt statements,46 the Court held that all testimonial statements
fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.47 The Supreme
Court also rejected the notion that the Confrontation Clause
could be satisfied through admissibility under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, stating that “we do not think the Framers meant to
leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the
rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’ ”48 The Supreme Court rejected the Roberts test,
stating that it did not provide “any meaningful protection.”49 The
Court held that although the Confrontation Clause does promote
the reliability of evidence, it mandates “that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.”50 Noting that statements elicited through
police interrogation are testimonial, the Supreme Court held that
the admission of the defendant’s wife’s testimony without the
government calling her to the stand violated the Confrontation
Clause.51
The Supreme Court did not provide a definition of
testimonial in Crawford. The Court waited until Davis v.
Washington52 to do so. In that case, the Court stated:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no

45

Id.
Id. at 50–51.
47
Id. at 59.
48
Id. at 61.
49
Id. at 68.
50
Id. at 61.
51
Id. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
52
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46
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such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.53

Accordingly, any statements made during a police interrogation,
when the information elicited is not used to respond to an active
emergency, are testimonial.54
Five years after Crawford, the Supreme Court decided
another Confrontation Clause case, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.55 In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was charged
with distributing cocaine.56 As part of the evidence against the
defendant, the police seized nineteen plastic bags of cocaine that
the defendant and his accomplices tried to hide in a police car.57
Those bags were submitted to a state lab to conduct tests.58
At trial, the government offered the bags into evidence with
three certificates of analysis, which stated that the bags, as
shown by a forensic analysis, contained cocaine.59 The defendant
objected to the certificates, arguing that allowing the certificates
into evidence without having the lab technician who conducted
the forensic analysis on the stand would violate the
Confrontation Clause, particularly in light of Crawford.60 The
objection was overruled, and the defendant was convicted.61
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, holding that
the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were
violated when the certificates of analysis were admitted into
evidence without putting the lab technician on the stand.62 As an
initial matter, the Supreme Court noted that the certificates of
analysis were testimonial.63 Testimonial statements can include
affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony.64 Although called

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 822.
Id.; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 310.
Id.
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certificates of analysis, they were akin to affidavits because they
contained sworn-to statements of fact.65 Thus, these certificates
of analysis were subject to the Confrontation Clause.66
The government made several arguments, all rejected by the
Court, worth mentioning. The government argued that the
Confrontation Clause did not apply because the certificates of
analysis themselves were not accusatory, but only became
relevant when viewed with the other evidence.67 The Supreme
Court rejected that argument, noting that nothing in the Sixth
Amendment necessitates that the evidence be accusatory, only
that the witness be against the defendant.68 There, the lab
technician, by virtue of his certificate of analysis, became a
witness against the defendant, implicating the Confrontation
Clause.69
The government also claimed that the certificates of analysis
satisfied the Confrontation Clause because the certificates were
the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.”70 The Supreme Court
stated that that was a return to the Roberts test, the “sincerejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible so
long as it bore indicia of reliability.”71 Thus, the fact that the
certificates of analysis and the testing may have been reliable is
of no relevance to the Confrontation Clause.72
The government also had an argument based on judicial
economy.
The government argued that it would be too
burdensome to always call the lab technician to the stand
whenever some sort of forensic analysis was conducted in a
criminal case.73 But the Court rejected that argument too, noting
that “[t]he Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of
criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 317 (alteration in original).
Id. at 312, 317.
See id. at 317–18.
Id. at 325.
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to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.”74
The Court could not disregard the Confrontation Clause because
it was convenient to do so.75
Finally, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,76 the Supreme Court
dealt with surrogate testimony under the Confrontation Clause.
Surrogate testimony is when someone familiar with the policies
and procedures of a process, but who did not actually conduct the
process at issue, testifies about that process.77 In Bullcoming, the
defendant was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”) after failing field sobriety tests.78 Since the defendant
refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, the police obtained a
warrant to conduct a blood alcohol test.79 After the defendant’s
blood was drawn at a hospital, it was sent to a laboratory for
analysis, where it was revealed that the defendant’s blood alcohol
concentration (“BAC”) was 0.21, well over the legal limit.80
At trial, the government stated that it would not be calling
the analyst who actually performed the analysis of defendant’s
blood because the analyst had been placed on unpaid leave.81
Instead, the government stated that it would put another analyst
on the stand who could testify about the general policies and
procedures of the laboratory.82 Defense counsel objected, arguing
that such surrogate testimony would violate the defendant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause.83 The objection was
overruled, and the defendant was convicted of aggravated DWI.84
The Supreme Court held that such surrogate testimony
violated the Confrontation Clause, overruling the New Mexico
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rejected the analysis of its
New Mexico counterpart that there was no Confrontation Clause
violation because the analyst merely “transcribed” information
74

Id.
Id.
76
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
77
Id. at 2710.
78
Id. at 2710, 2711.
79
Id. at 2710.
80
Id. at 2710–11. In New Mexico, it is illegal to operate a motor vehicle with a
BAC of .08 or higher. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (West 2010). Because the
defendant’s BAC was at or higher than .16, the defendant was charged with
aggravated DWI. Id.
81
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711–12.
82
Id. at 2712.
83
Id.
84
Id.
75
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from a machine used to analyze the defendant’s blood.85 The
Supreme Court noted that surrogate testimony could not show
what exactly the lab technician did to test the blood or show any
errors in the testing process.86 The Supreme Court held that
when the results of the test performed by the lab technician were
introduced, the lab technician who actually conducted those tests
became a witness against the defendant, thus implicating the
Confrontation Clause.87
There are a few concepts that are clear from the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause. First,
statements elicited during police interrogations, when there is no
ongoing emergency to respond to, are testimonial.88 Second, there
is no reliability exception to the Confrontation Clause.89 No
matter how reliable some testimonial statements may be, they
are still subject to the Confrontation Clause.90 Even if the
declarant is a neutral person with no interest in the litigation,
the defendant still has the right to cross-examine the declarant.91
Third, surrogate testimony does not satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.92 Fourth, the Confrontation Clause is separate from the
rules of evidence.93 Unfortunately, the courts that apply the
language conduit-agency theory to interpreters under the
Confrontation Clause ignore these concepts.
II. TRANSLATOR TESTIMONY AND CONFRONTATION: THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT
A. The Ninth Circuit and the Majority View
Most circuit courts that have faced the question of whether
interpreters’ statements from police interrogations are subject to
the Confrontation Clause have held that they are not. The most
aggressive circuit in holding that interpreters who translate a
defendants’ statements during police interrogations are not
subject to the Confrontation Clause is the United States Court of
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 2714, 2715 (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010)).
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2716.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317–18 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 318–19.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–16.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose jurisprudence on the
application of the language conduit-agency theory to the
Confrontation Clause dates back to the 1991 case of United
States v. Nazemian.94 Nazemian was the first case to apply the
language conduit-agency theory, which had previously only been
used to get around the hearsay rules,95 to the Confrontation
Clause.
Under the language conduit-agency theory, the
translator is considered to be a language conduit or agent of the
defendant, so the translator’s statements are imputed to the
defendant.96 Since the defendant cannot cross-examine himself,
there is no Confrontation Clause issue.97
Nazemian and subsequent cases utilized four factors to
determine if a translator was acting as an agent or language
conduit of the defendant. The four factors from Nazemian are
(1) the party that supplied the translator; (2) whether the
interpreter had a motive to lie; (3) the interpreter’s language
expertise; and (4) “whether actions subsequent to the
conversation were consistent with the statements as
The fact that the government is the party
translated.”98
supplying the translator, though, does not automatically preclude
the translator from being an agent of the defendant.99 Those
factors answer the initial question, according to the Ninth
Circuit, of whether the interpreter’s statements can be imputed
to the defendant under the language conduit-agency theory.100
Crawford v. Washington101 and its progeny have not changed
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the language conduit-agency
theory to the Confrontation Clause. In a post-Crawford case,
United States v. Orm Hieng,102 the Ninth Circuit reiterated its
94
948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have also adopted
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the language conduit-agency theory as applied
to the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248–49 (4th
Cir. 2013); United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012).
95
See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973).
96
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that
if the language conduit-agency theory applies, “the defendant cannot claim that he
was denied the opportunity to confront himself”); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527–28.
97
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139.
98
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139.
99
United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442–43 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at
527–28.
100
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527.
101
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
102
679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012).
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application of the language conduit-agency theory to the
Confrontation Clause and decided that Crawford and its progeny
did not necessitate a change in such application.103 The Ninth
Circuit in Orm Hieng concluded that Crawford and its progeny
only require confrontation of the person who made the
statement.104 Under the language conduit-agency theory, the
statement is imputed to the defendant, who cannot crossexamine himself.105 The court in Orm Hieng further held that
Crawford and its progeny never addressed the question of
whether a translator is the declarant under the language
conduit-agency theory, or even whether the language conduitagency theory applies.106 The court concluded that it “can apply
Nazemian without running afoul of Crawford.”107
Significantly, Nazemian and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases
are unclear and ambiguous in explaining whether they are
holding that an interpreter is a language conduit or an agent of
the defendant, or both. Whichever rationale the Ninth Circuit
has used, there is no basis for the interpreter to be either a
language conduit or an agent of the defendant.108 Nazemian’s
reference to the “agency-language conduit theory” only adds to
such ambiguity.109 Indeed, after finding that there was no
Confrontation Clause issue, the Ninth Circuit in Nazemian held
that it was not erroneous for the United States District Court for
the Central District of California to consider the translator as a
language conduit or an agent, without explaining which one, or
both, applied.110 The Ninth Circuit then stated that since the
interpreter was a language conduit or agent of the defendant,
there was no Confrontation Clause issue.111
Two more post-Crawford Ninth Circuit cases that were
decided within two months of each other show the inability of
that circuit to clearly explain whether the interpreter is a

103

Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1140.
105
Id. at 1139.
106
Id. at 1140.
107
Id.
108
See infra Part III.
109
United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
110
Id. at 528.
111
Id.
104
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language conduit or agent of the defendant, or both. In United
States v. Boskovic,112 the Ninth Circuit, in applying the language
conduit-agency theory, only used the term “language conduit.”113
The words agent and agency as applied to the language conduitagency theory were nowhere to be found in that case.114 But less
than two months later, in United States v. Santacruz,115 the Ninth
Circuit held that there was no Confrontation Clause issue
because the interpreter was a language conduit or agent of the
defendant—once again, without explaining which one, or both,
applied.116 That case, like the other Ninth Circuit cases on the
issue, did not contain any sort of analysis using the principles of
agency.117
Significantly, no Ninth Circuit case has ever decided whether
interpreters’ statements from pretrial interrogations are
testimonial.118 Instead, the Ninth Circuit has avoided the
question by holding that, as a preliminary matter, there is no
Confrontation Clause issue because the statements belong to the
defendant under the language conduit-agency theory.119
B.

The Eleventh Circuit Creates a Circuit Split

The language conduit-agency theory as applied to the
Confrontation Clause was rejected for the first time in United
States v. Charles.120 In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the language conduitagency theory because interpreters do not translate word-forword, but rather translate ideas and concepts, so the defendant
Moreover,
and the translator had different statements.121
112

472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 608.
114
See id.
115
480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012).
116
Id. at 443.
117
See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x
607 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991).
118
See generally Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d at 955; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131;
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x at 441; Boskovic, 472 F. App’x at 607; Nazemian, 948 F.2d
at 522.
119
See generally Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d at 955; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131;
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x at 441; Boskovic, 472 F. App’x at 607; Nazemian, 948 F.2d
at 522.
120
722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).
121
Id. at 1324.
113
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colloquial expressions and differences in dialect make translation
all the more difficult.122 Because the statements of the defendant
and the interpreter differed, the interpreter was not a language
conduit.123 The Eleventh Circuit also found that the interpreter’s
statements were testimonial because they were elicited during a
police interrogation.124 Since the statements were testimonial
and the language conduit-agency theory did not apply, the
interpreter was subject to the Confrontation Clause.125
The government in Charles urged the court to adopt the
language conduit-agency theory as per the Eleventh Circuit’s
prior reasoning in United States v. Alvarez.126 The Eleventh
Circuit in Alvarez, analyzing the hearsay rules, used the
language conduit-agency theory to make a translator’s
statements party-opponent statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).127 But Alvarez did not discuss the
Confrontation Clause.128
Using Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit in Charles pointed out
that the language conduit-agency theory does not assume that
the defendant was the declarant.129 The Charles court noted that
had the court in Alvarez viewed the defendant as the declarant,
the statements would have been admitted under Federal Rule
Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as party-opponent statements, and the
court would not have had to go to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) for statements authorized by a party or
statements by a party’s agent.130 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that even if translators’ statements can be considered
reliable, Crawford specifically rejected reliability as a test under
the Confrontation Clause.131 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the language conduit-agency theory’s viability under the
Confrontation Clause.132 Because statements of a defendant
taken during police interrogations are testimonial, the Eleventh

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 859–60.
Charles, 722 F.3d at 1325.
See id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1327–28.
Id. at 1330–31.
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Circuit held that any interpreted statements taken during a
police interrogation are also deemed testimonial.133 The Eleventh
Circuit thus held that the interpreter who interpreted during the
police interrogation was subject to the Confrontation Clause.134
III. THE LANGUAGE CONDUIT-AGENCY THEORY IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
There are several reasons why the language conduit-agency
theory should be rejected as applied to the Confrontation Clause
when a defendant’s statements from a police interrogation are
being offered into evidence. First, as an initial matter, the
Supreme Court has held that statements from police
interrogations are testimonial, so those statements fall within
the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Second, the language
conduit-agency theory’s use of an agency relationship has no
basis in agency law. Third, the language conduit-agency theory’s
imputation of statements from an interpreter to a defendant
comes from the hearsay rules and has no basis in the
Confrontation Clause. Finally, the language conduit-agency
theory improperly relies on reliability. Thus, interpreters who
translate a defendant’s statements at a police interrogation
should be subject to the Confrontation Clause if the government
wants to introduce the interpreter’s statements into evidence.
A.

Interpreters’ Statements Are Testimonial

The Eleventh Circuit in Charles was correct to hold that a
defendant’s interpreted statements from a police interrogation
are testimonial.
A statement is “testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”135 Testimonial statements, “at a minimum,” include
statements taken at police interrogations.136 Interpreters are
and statements
often used during police interrogations,137
elicited during police interrogations are “testimonial under even

133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1330–31.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
See Lindie, supra note 10; Miller et al., supra note 10.
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a narrow standard.”138 In such an interrogation, there is no
ongoing emergency that the police need to respond to. Indeed,
the sole purpose of such an interrogation is to gather evidence for
a criminal prosecution. Moreover, statements need not be
accusatory to be subject to the Confrontation Clause.139
Therefore, statements taken by interpreters during pretrial
police interrogations are testimonial.
In defense of the language conduit-agency theory, the Ninth
Circuit has inferred that one reason why interpreters are not
subject to the Confrontation Clause is that they are reliable,
noting that interpreters have no “motive to mistranslate.”140
Reliability was the old test used in Ohio v. Roberts.141 But such a
reliability test for the Confrontation Clause has been expressly
rejected, several times, by the Supreme Court.142 In Crawford v.
Washington,143 the Supreme Court, in rejecting the Roberts test,
stated that “we do not think the Framers meant to leave the
Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’ ”144
The Supreme Court was even more explicit in
Melendez-Diaz, noting that the Roberts test used the
“since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was
admissible so long as it bore indicia of reliability.”145 The Court in
Melendez-Diaz held that even though scientific testimony may be
neutral, and forensic analysts have no personal interest in the
outcome of the case, such testimony is subject to the
Confrontation Clause.146 The Court held that confrontation could
expose an expert with a “lack of proper training or deficiency in
judgment.”147 Similarly here, even though interpreters may be
neutral, they should still be subject to the Confrontation Clause,
138

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009). Statements are
not accusatory if they do not make direct accusations of criminality against the
defendant, but only inculpate the defendant when taken in conjunction with other
evidence. Id.
140
See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012).
141
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
142
See supra Part I.B.
143
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
144
Id. at 61.
145
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009) (citing Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66).
146
Id. at 317.
147
Id. at 320.
139
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and confrontation may expose interpreters who mistranslate
defendants’ statements. Thus, even if it were to be assumed that
interpreters are reliable, that is of no consequence under the
Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause issue arises here because the
interpreter who interpreted a defendant’s statements at a police
interrogation is not called to testify. Instead, a third party who
happens to be present during the translation, usually a member
of law enforcement, testifies as to what the interpreter
translated.148 That is essentially what surrogate testimony is.149
But, as noted above, the Supreme Court in Bullcoming held that
surrogate testimony does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.150
Since the translator is the one that is doing the translating, it is
that translator, and not anyone else, who must testify.151
Simply put, translated statements of defendants from police
interrogations are being elicited for the sole purpose of future
criminal prosecution; thus, they are testimonial. Finding that
interpreted statements from pretrial interrogations are subject to
the Confrontation Clause “involves little more than the
application of [the Supreme Court’s] holding in Crawford v.
Washington” and subsequent cases.152
B.

The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Is a Perversion of
Agency Law

One main point of the language conduit-agency theory is
that the interpreter is treated as an agent of the defendant, so
there is no Confrontation Clause issue.153 Despite this, no Ninth
Circuit case involving the language conduit-agency theory has
ever discussed agency law,154 perhaps because the language
conduit-agency theory’s use of agency has no basis in agency law.

148
See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1136, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2012).
149
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
150
See supra Part I.B.
151
See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716.
152
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329.
153
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528
(9th Cir. 1991).
154
See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012);
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131; United States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir.
2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948
F.2d at 522.
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Agency is “a consensual relationship in which one person . . . acts
as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another
person with power to affect the legal rights and duties of the
other person. The person represented has a right to control the
actions of the agent.”155 However, the language conduit-agency
theory fails to satisfy several essential elements of an agency
relationship.
First, one of the requirements of an agency relationship is
that the principal must manifest his assent to the agency
relationship.156 Indeed, the requirement of manifestation is part
of the definition of agency.157 Significantly, “[a] manifestation
does not occur in a vacuum, and the meaning that may
reasonably be inferred from it will reflect the context in which
the manifestation is made.”158
When a defendant is being interrogated by law enforcement,
there is absolutely no manifestation by the defendant that he
consents to the agency relationship. The defendant has been
arrested or is a person of interest in a criminal investigation, and
the interpreter just so happens to be present at the interrogation.
The defendant was not the person who requested the interpreter;
law enforcement did. The defendant in such a situation did not
do anything to manifest his acceptance of an agency relationship.
And merely allowing the interpreter to translate cannot possibly
be a manifestation of assent, as it is black-letter law that only the
acts of the principal, not of the agent, may bind the principal and
agent together.159
Another basic element of an agency relationship is that the
agent be subject to the principal’s control.160 The ability of the
principal to control the agent is part of the very definition of an
155

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006).
Id. § 1.01; Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 600 (11th Cir. 2011);
Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 2006).
157
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d (2006).
158
Id. § 1.03.
159
Velasco v. Gov’t of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 400 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004); Auvil v.
Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[There is a] well-established
tenet that an agent cannot create his own authority to represent a principal.”); Kuhn
v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 118, 134, 8 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1937).
160
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006); Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co., 696 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2012); Atrium of
Princeton, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 684 F.3d 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jurgens v. Poling
Transp. Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 388, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (referring to control as “[t]he
most critical element” in an agency relationship).
156
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agency relationship.161
Indeed, without the ability of the
principal to control the agent, no agency relationship exists.162
When looking at the element of control, courts look at the right of
the principal to control the agent, not actual control.163
When being interrogated by law enforcement, the defendant
cannot exercise control over the interpreter. The defendant
cannot tell the interpreter to leave the room or not to translate
something. If law enforcement officers are conversing amongst
themselves on a matter that they do not want the interpreter to
translate for the defendant, the defendant cannot order the
interpreter to translate it anyway. Simply put, the interpreter in
such a situation is controlled by law enforcement, not the
defendant. Thus, without the ability of the defendant to control
the interpreter, “there is no agency relationship.”164
Lastly, there is no agency relationship between an
interpreter and a defendant because the interpreter does not
have the power to alter the legal relationship between the
principal and third parties. The ability of an agent to do so is one
of the “essential characteristics” of the agency relationship.165
The ability to alter the legal relationship between the principal
and third parties means that the agent can “(1) bind the principal
in contract with a third person; (2) divest the principal of interest
in a thing, such as selling the principal’s goods to a third person;
(3) acquire new interests for the principal; or (4) subject the
principal to tort liability by injuring a third person.”166
As between an interpreter and a defendant, the interpreter
cannot alter the legal relationship between the principal and
third parties. The interpreter cannot enter into a contract on

161
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
162
Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bowoto v.
Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
163
In re Coupon Clearing Serv., Inc., 113 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997);
Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013); A.P.I. Inc.
Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Home Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 709, 722 (D. Minn.
2012).
164
In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
165
Prof’l Commc’ns, Inc. v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551
(D. Md. 2001); see also BancOklahoma Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d
1089, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 (1958).
166
Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 220 (6th Cir. 1992); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 cmt. a (1958).
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behalf of the defendant with a third party, divest the principal of
interest in property, acquire new property for the principal, or
subject the principal to tort liability. There is simply no way for
the interpreter to change the legal relationship between the
defendant and third parties. The only thing the interpreter does
is interpret, which does not change the legal relationship
between the defendant and any third parties.
Thus, the
interpreter cannot be an agent of the defendant.
Even if the elements of an agency relationship were to be
disregarded, the interpreter would be breaching his duty to the
defendant because agents have “a duty not to deal with the
principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction
connected with the agency relationship.”167 Indeed, an agency
relationship is a fiduciary relationship, and the agent owes the
principal a duty of good faith.168 Acting on behalf of an adverse
party generally violates this duty of good faith.169
When an interpreter is being used at a pretrial interrogation
to translate the defendant’s words into English, the interpreter is
acting on behalf of law enforcement. The defendant did not bring
the interpreter to the interrogation; law enforcement did. And
since law enforcement is presumably investigating a crime that
the defendant was a suspect in, and later becomes prosecuted for,
law enforcement is adverse to the defendant. This is inherently
inconsistent with agency law. If the interpreter, as the language
conduit-agency theory suggests,170 is an agent of the defendant,
then the interpreter is breaching his duty of good faith by acting
on behalf of an adverse party.
If the interpreter is the
defendant’s agent for the purposes of translation, then the
transaction—that is, the translation—is voidable at the

167
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006); see also Robertson v.
Chapman, 152 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1894); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d
926, 934 (10th Cir. 1954).
168
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006); Tow v. Amegy Bank N.A.,
976 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (S.D. Tex. 2013); UBS AG, Stamford Branch v.
HealthSouth Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
169
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006); UBS AG, Stamford Branch,
645 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 911 F. Supp.
1130, 1153–54 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
170
See supra Part II.A.
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defendant’s option.171 This means that, if the interpreter was the
defendant’s agent, the defendant could simply void the
translation.
The relationship between an interpreter and a defendant is
inherently inconsistent with an agency relationship. Some of the
elements of an agency relationship are absent, and even if they
were present, the interpreter would be violating his duty to the
defendant, the principal, by acting on behalf of law enforcement.
Thus, an interpreter appearing on behalf of law enforcement
cannot possibly be an agent of the defendant.
C.

The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Improperly Conflates
the Confrontation Clause with the Hearsay Rules

The whole premise of the language conduit-agent theory is
that because the statements of an interpreter can be imputed to
the defendant, there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the
defendant cannot cross-examine himself.172 But this whole
concept of imputation exists under the hearsay rules, not the
Confrontation Clause. Essentially, the language conduit-agency
theory holds that there is no Confrontation Clause issue if the
statement would be a party-opponent statement under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). In applying the language conduitagency theory to the Confrontation Clause, the Ninth Circuit has
improperly conflated the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rules.
This conflation is apparent from the language of United
The court there stated that, as a
States v. Nazemian.173
preliminary matter under the Confrontation Clause, it had to
decide whether the defendant or the interpreter was the
speaker.174 The court noted that “[t]his threshold question
likewise controls the hearsay analysis. If the statements are
viewed as [the defendant’s] own, they would constitute
admissions properly characterized as non-hearsay under [Federal

171
See Television Events & Mktg., Inc. v. AMCON Distrib. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1078–79 (D. Haw. 2006); Hidden Brook Air, Inc. v. Thabet Aviation Int’l Inc.,
241 F. Supp. 2d 246, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 873 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D. Mass. 1995).
172
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1991).
173
948 F.2d 522.
174
Id. at 525.
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Rule of Evidence] 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).”175 The court then found
that because the interpreter’s statements could be imputed to the
defendant, the statements were admissible under both the
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.176
Post-Nazemian jurisprudence from the Ninth Circuit further
shows the conflation of the hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause in the language conduit-agency theory. In United States v.
Romo-Chavez,177 the defendant challenged the admission of an
interpreter’s statements on hearsay and Confrontation Clause
grounds.178 In that case, it was not the interpreter, coincidentally
a law enforcement officer, who testified about the interpreted
statements, but another law enforcement officer who was present
during the interpretation.179 There, interestingly, the court
analyzed the four Nazemian factors while analyzing hearsay, not
the Confrontation Clause.180 After the court concluded that the
interpreter’s statements did not constitute inadmissible hearsay,
the court held that there was no Confrontation Clause issue
because, using the hearsay analysis, the interpreter’s statements
belonged to the defendant.181
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Boskovic182 was much
more explicit about its conflation of the hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause.
There, the defendant appealed his
conviction by asserting that his Confrontation Clause rights were
violated when an interpreter’s statements were admitted.183 The
Ninth Circuit in that case, in a blatant showing of the conflation,
stated that if an interpreter is a language conduit, “the
statements are viewed as the defendant’s own . . . [and] they do
not constitute inadmissible hearsay and their admission does not
violate the Confrontation Clause.”184 The Ninth Circuit found the
interpreter’s statements belonged “to [the defendant] and, as
party admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), they
were not hearsay.
Their admission did not violate the

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id. at 526.
See id. at 528.
681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id. at 959–61.
See id. at 961.
472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 608.
Id.
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Confrontation Clause.”185 There, the court used its hearsay
analysis and found that the interpreter’s statements were
attributable to the defendant. Thus, the court held that there
was no Confrontation Clause issue for the same reason.
Significantly, this conflation is proscribed by the Supreme
Court’s separation of the law of evidence from the Confrontation
Clause. The Supreme Court in Crawford specifically stated that
“we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence.”186 Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the old
Roberts test, which held that evidence that fell under a firmlyrooted hearsay exception did not pose a Confrontation Clause
issue.187 The rejected Roberts test did the same thing that the
Ninth Circuit is currently doing: conflating the hearsay rules
with the Confrontation Clause.188 For this reason, the language
conduit-agency theory is inherently incompatible with the
Confrontation Clause.
D.

The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Relies on Reliability,
an Approach Rejected by Crawford and Its Progeny for the
Confrontation Clause

As noted above, the language conduit-agency theory uses
four factors to determine if an interpreter is a language conduit
or agent of the defendant.189 One of those factors is given little
significance by courts, and the other three all go toward
reliability.
Reliability, though, is irrelevant under the
Confrontation Clause.190 Moreover, even if reliability were an
acceptable test under the Confrontation Clause, interpreters are
not reliable to begin with. Thus, the language conduit-agency
theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause.

185
186
187
188
189
190

Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.B.
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The Nazemian Factors Are Based on Reliability, Which Is
Irrelevant Under the Confrontation Clause.

Even if the Nazemian court were correct in applying the
language conduit-agency theory to the Confrontation Clause,
such an application is no longer valid after Crawford and its
progeny. As noted above, the language conduit-agency theory
takes four factors into account when deciding whether an
interpreter is a language conduit: the party that supplied the
interpreter; whether the interpreter had a motive to lie; the
interpreter’s language expertise; and “whether actions
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the
statements as translated.”191 Courts do not give the first factor
much importance, as the fact that the government provided the
translator does not necessarily mean that the interpreter cannot
serve as a language conduit.192 The three latter factors, though,
all go toward reliability. However, as noted above, the Supreme
Court has expressly rejected reliability as a suitable test under
the Confrontation Clause.193 Since the Nazemian factors go
toward reliability, the language conduit-agency theory is
inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause.
The second factor of the language conduit-agency theory,
whether the interpreter had a motive to lie, has no plausible goal
other than to ensure the interpreter’s reliability. Indeed, courts
have regularly found such a factor to go toward reliability.194 The
third factor, the interpreter’s language expertise, must also go
toward reliability.
The whole point of ensuring that the
interpreter has sufficient training in a language is to ensure that
the translation is accurate, which bears on reliability.195 Finally,
the final language conduit factor, whether the defendant’s

191
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991).
192
United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442–43 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at
527–28.
193
See supra Part I.B.
194
Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2006); State
v. Anderson, 733 P.2d 517, 520 (Wash. 1987).
195
Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Diaz
v. State, 743 A.2d 1166, 1182–83 (Del. 1999); State v. Rodriguez, 682 A.2d 764, 769
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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subsequent actions are consistent with the translation, could only
serve to reinforce the accuracy of the translation; thus, it goes to
reliability.196
But the Supreme Court rejected reliability as an acceptable
test under the Confrontation Clause.197 Since the language
conduit factors bear on reliability, the language conduit-agency
theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause.
2.

Interpreters Are Not Necessarily Reliable

Not only is reliability not an acceptable test under the
Confrontation Clause, but interpreters are not reliable to begin
with. Thus, even if the Confrontation Clause could be satisfied
by reliability, interpreters’ statements would not meet that
standard. Interpreters are not always accurate, and interpreters
cannot possibly be language conduits because they do not
translate word-for-word.
There are a few reasons that could explain why interpreters
are not always accurate. First, at least in federal court, there are
no uniform qualifications for interpreters; instead, they vary from
district to district, and sometimes from courtroom to
In addition, federal courts only administer
courtroom.198
proficiency tests for Spanish interpreters, not interpreters of any
other language.199 Interpreters could also be unfamiliar with a
different dialect of a language.200 Moreover, interpreters do not
translate word-for-word, but instead translate concepts and
ideas.201 In so doing, interpreters are not language conduits, but
are using their own judgment in determining what words to use.
Finally, interpreters can become subject to mental fatigue after
thirty to forty minutes of interpreting, which results in “a marked
loss of accuracy.”202

196

Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 348–49.
See supra Part I.B.
198
Virginia Benmaman & Isabel Framer, Foreign Langauge Interpreters and the
Judicial System, in, CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 139 (Linda Friedman
Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010).
199
Id. at 137–38.
200
See John Eligon, In Court, Lost in Translation, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2011,
11:55 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/lost-in-translation/.
201
United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013); Benmaman &
Framer, supra note 198, at 163–64.
202
Benmaman & Framer, supra note 198, at 170–71.
197
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As a result, in addition to United States v. Yurofsky,203 there
are many instances of inaccurate interpreters in the American
legal system. In United States v. Santos,204 a magistrate judge
found that a tape recording had been inaccurately interpreted.205
The judge found that the transcript of the conversation contained
“numerous significant omissions and unnecessary additions and
remarks.”206 In Rodriguez v. State,207 an interpreter was so
inaccurate that the court instructed the jury as such and brought
in a new translator.208 In Ouanbenboune v. State,209 a murder
case, the court held that the trial interpreter’s “inaccuracies did
fundamentally alter the context of [the defendant’s] testimony.”210
In Ponce v. State,211 as a trial judge was advising a defendant of
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, an interpreter was
translating that colloquy for the defendant.212
But the
translation was so inaccurate that defendant did not know what
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, so the defendant’s
guilty plea was vacated because he did not waive his rights
knowingly and intelligently.213 In People v. Cabrera,214 the
interpreter at trial was so inaccurate that some of the jurors,
during deliberations, noted the inaccuracies and provided a
different translation for the entire jury.215 The list goes on and
on, but the point is clear: Mistakes happen during translations.
The most effective way to discover these mistakes would be
through cross-examination, the only remedy that the
Confrontation Clause provides.

203
148 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 55 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2002); see
supra Introduction.
204
No. 92-289(RLA), 1993 WL 278557 (D.P.R. 1993).
205
Id. at *1.
206
Id.
207
518 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. 1999).
208
Id. at 136.
209
220 P.3d 1122 (Nev. 2009).
210
Id. at 1125.
211
9 N.E.3d 1265 (Ind. 2014).
212
Id. at 1271.
213
Id. at 1271–72, 1274.
214
281 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
215
Id. at 242.
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IV. A SOLUTION
Obtaining for trial the same interpreter from an
interrogation could be a difficult task for the prosecutor; after all,
a trial can take place a year or more after an interrogation, and
people die, move, become ill, or otherwise become unreachable.
But there is a simple solution here. The problem with the
language conduit-agency theory only arises if the prosecutor
wants to use the interpreter’s statements from an interrogation
at trial. There is no Confrontation Clause issue if the defendant’s
own statements, as opposed to the interpreter’s statements, are
admitted.216 Thus, whenever an interpreter is needed at an
interrogation, the prosecutor or law enforcement official could
record it. Whether it is a video or only an audio recording is
unimportant, as long as the interrogation is audible. Before trial,
the prosecutor would eliminate the interpreter’s statements and
only keep the defendant’s statements in his native language and
the interrogator’s questions.217 At trial, the prosecutor would
have an interpreter, and not necessarily the same interpreter
from the interrogation, translate the defendant’s statements from
the interrogation. That translator would be on the stand, so
216
See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that admission of the defendant’s own statement did not violate
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that a defendant’s own statements “obviously pose no problem” under the
Confrontation Clause).
217
The interrogator’s questions would be admissible at trial. In order to
constitute hearsay, the statement or conduct in question must be an assertion, FED.
R. EVID. 801(a), and questions are not hearsay because they are not assertions.
United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “as a matter of
law, questions are not ‘assertions’ within the meaning of Rule 801” and are therefore
not hearsay); United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
question is typically not hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a
fact.”). Without any assertions, questions cannot be offered for their truth, so they
are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2). People v. Gholam, 99
A.D.3d 441, 443, 951 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (4th Dep’t 2012) (holding, under New York
law, that “[q]uestions themselves are not hearsay because they are not offered for
their truth”). Additionally, questions are not testimonial under the Confrontation
Clause because questions cannot “establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see
also United States v. Johnson, No. 3:14-CR-02, 2014 WL 3954998, at *10 (N.D.W.
Va. Aug. 13, 2014) (noting that questions are not testimonial under Confrontation
Clause); Davenport v. Davis, No. 07-12047, 2009 WL 960411, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
7, 2009) (rejecting, in habeas corpus proceeding, the Confrontation Clause claim
because “the victim did not answer any of [the officer’s] questions; thus, there were
no testimonial statements made by the victim to the officer”). Thus, the
interrogator’s questions would be admissible.
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defense counsel could cross-examine him.
Because that
translator’s interpretation would be the only one shown to the
jury, the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied. There would
not even be any issues with surrogate testimony because the
same interpreter who did the translation shown to the jury would
be subject to cross-examination.218
Thus, the solution for
prosecutors to the flaws in the language conduit-agency theory is
for the prosecutor to introduce a recording of the interrogation,
excise the interpreter’s statements from that recording, and have
a new interpreter at trial translate the defendant’s statements.
CONCLUSION
There is only one way to satisfy the Confrontation Clause:
calling the witness to the stand so the defendant can crossexamine him. That rule should be substituted for the language
conduit-agency theory when applied to interpreted statements of
a defendant from a police interrogation because the language
conduit-agency theory is inherently incompatible with the
Confrontation Clause. The language conduit-agency theory’s
imputation of an interpreter’s statements to the defendant comes
from the hearsay rules and has no basis in the Confrontation
Clause. Its use of an agency relationship has no basis in agency
law. It ignores the reality that interpreters make mistakes and
are not always accurate. If the government wants to introduce
interpreted statements of a defendant from a police
interrogation, then the government should have to call the
interpreter to the stand. Subjecting the interpreter to the
Confrontation Clause is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in Crawford and its progeny. Interpreters, like all
other purveyors of testimonial statements, should be subject to
the “crucible of cross-examination.”219

218
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011) (stating that the
prosecution could have avoided a Confrontation Clause issue involving surrogate
testimony by having the analyst who testified at trial redo the blood test himself
instead of having him testify about a blood test that he did not conduct).
219
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).

